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aside the regulations as unconstitutional. 
Nevertheless, as in Agins, the court of ap-
peals did not find an unconstitutional tak-
ing because "the refusal of the defendants 
to permit the intensive development de-
sired by the landowner does not preclude 
less intensive, but still valuable develop-
ment. Accordingly, the complaint fails to 
state a cause of action." MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4783. 
The Supreme Court granted the appel-
lants petition to consider the constitutional 
issue involving a regulatory taking. But, in 
a decision that essentially mirrored the 
lower courts reasoning, the Supreme Court 
did not make a final decision on the merits 
because a final determination had not been 
made by the Board of Commissioners con-
cerning the permitted use of the appellants 
property, thus making the issue not ripe 
for decision despite the prohibition on the 
housing development. Id. at 4784. 
In refusing to decide on the merits, the 
Court followed Agins in permitting local 
governments the power ofland use control 
through regulations that limit intensive 
development. The Court centered its rea-
soning behind two related components. 
First, that the appellant must establish 
that the regulation has "taken" his prop-
erty or has "gone too far." Second, that any 
proffered compensation is simply not just. 
MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4784. 
The Court, in resolving the two com-
ponents, examined the progeny of , 'taking" 
cases evolving from Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), through 
Penn Central v. New York City, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978); Agins, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), 
and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San 
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), to Williamson 
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 
473 U.S. __ (1985). MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4784. 
In Williamson, the appellant-developer 
failed to exhaust available state avenues to 
permit development or receive just com-
pensation. MacDonald, 54 U.S.L.W. at 
4784. And in Agins, the Court failed to 
recognize a taking because development, 
albeit less intensive, was still permitted. In 
applying the facts in this action to their 
past examinations, Justice Stevens went 
on to conclude that as in Agins, William-
son, and San Diego Gas, the Court cannot 
decide whether the Constitution requires a 
monetary remedy to redress some regu-
latory takings because the appellant had 
left the Court uncertain as to whether a 
taking had occurred. MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4785. The appellant had re-
ceived the Board's determination on only 
the subdivision plan, thus leaving open 
the "final, definitive position regarding 
how [the board] will apply the regulations 
at issue to the particular land at issue." Id. 
Consequently, the appellant had not es-
tablished that their property had been 
taken and the Board's decision was upheld. 
Justice White, in his dissent, felt that 
a taking did occur when the Board de-
nied the subdivision plan. MacDonald, 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4785. He refuted the majori-
ties application of Agins, finding that the 
appellant would be unable "to develop his 
property in some economically beneficial 
manner" because further application for 
development would be futile. MacDonald, 
54 U.S.L.W. at 4786. The dissent went on 
to conclude that based on the facts, a tak-
ing had occurred and the Court should re-
mand for an explanation by the court of 
appeals as to the precise basis for its judg-
ment. Id. at 4788. 
The impact of this decision will favor 
municipalities that seek to limit growth by 
denying high density housing develop-
ments and support state regulations such 
as Maryland's recently enacted Critical 
Areas Legislation. Conversely, developers 
will certainly feel as the dissent, that any 
limit to use is a taking deserving of com-
pensation. Nevertheless, the Court seems 
to be assured of maintaining the view out-
lined in MacDonald as long as the 5-4 ma-
jority is maintained. And even with the re-
cent change in the make-up of the Court, 
which essentially effects the dissent's side, 
it seems likely that similar land use con-
trols will be sustained by the Court. 
-Michael D. Mallinoff 
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates 0, 
Tourism Co, of Puerto Rico: 
SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
REGULATIONS RESTRICTING 
ADVERTISING AIMED AT 
PUERTO RICO RESIDENTS 
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. 
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 54 U.S.L.W. 
4956 (U.S. June 24, 1986), the Supreme 
Court continued to explore the contours of 
first amendment protection for commer-
cial speech which the court had initially 
recognized in 1976. The Court held that a 
Puerto Rico statute and regulations re-
stricting the advertising of casino gambling 
aimed at the residents of Puerto Rico, but 
not at tourists, does not facially violate 
the first amendment or the due process or 
equal protection guarantees of the Consti-
tution. 
Beginning in 1948, the Puerto Rico 
Legislature has legalized various forms of 
casino gambling, adding additional games 
since the initial Games of Chance Act of 
1948, Act No. 221 of May 15, 1948 (Act). 
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, § 71 (1972). How-
ever, the Act states that "[n]o gambling 
room shall be permitted to advertise or 
otherwise offer their facilities to the public 
of Puerto Rico." P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 15, § 
77 (1972). Furthermore, the Economic De-
velopment Administration of Puerto Rico 
issued regulations which specified and ex-
panded the scope of the prohibition of ad-
vertising of casino gambling directed at 
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and requir-
ing prior approval by the Tourism De-
velopment Company of any casino adver-
tising. P.R.R. & Regs. tit. 15, § 76-218 
(1972). 
In 1981, the Appellant Posadas de Puerto 
Rico Associates, doing business as Con-
dado Holiday Inn Hotel and Sands Casino, 
filed a declaratory judgment action against 
the Tourism Company in the Superior 
Court of Puerto Rico, seeking a declara-
tion that this regulatory scheme violated 
appellant's commercial speech rights un-
der the United States Constitution. The 
court upheld the facial constitutionality of 
the Act, narrowly construing it as "the 
only advertisement prohibited by law orig-
inally is that which is contracted with an 
advertising agency, for consideration, to 
attract the resident to·bet at the dice, card, 
roulette and bingo tables." 54 U .S.L. W. at 
4958. The appellant's appeal was dismissed 
by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as "it 
[did] not present a substantial constitu-
tional question." Id. at 4959. However, the 
United States Supreme Court granted the 
petition for writ of certiorari filed by Po-
sadas de Puerto Rico Associates. 
The Supreme Court, in a five to four de-
cision, upheld the decision and narrowing 
construction issued by the lower court. 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, found two reasons for the Court's hold-
ing. First, he determined that by applying 
the first amendment analysis concerning 
commercial speech restrictions as dictated 
by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. 
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 
(1980), the Puerto Rico regulatory scheme 
passed constitutional muster. Second, the 
Court, creating a new form of first amend-
ment analysis parturient of greater enroads 
on the protection of speech, held that "the 
greater power to completely ban casino 
gambling necessarily includes the lesser 
power to ban advertising of casino gam-
bling." 54 U.S.L.W. at 4961. 
The Court reiterated that a limited form 
of first amendment protection for com-
mercial speech was first recognized in Vir-
ginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Counci~ Inc., 425 U.S. 
Fal4 1986rI'he Law Forum-l5 
748 (1976). However, the Court stated 
that the proper analysis is guided by the 
four-prong test found in Central Hudson 
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service 
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).54 U.S.L.W. 
at 4960. 
Applying the first prong of the Central 
Hudson test, the Court held that "[t]he par-
ticular kind of commercial speech at issue 
here ... concerns a lawful activity and is 
not misleading or fraudulent." Id. Moving 
on to the next prong, the Court found that 
regulatory scheme passed muster as "the 
Puerto Rico Legislature's interest in the 
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens 
constitutes a 'substantial' governmental in-
terest." Id. The third prong was also found 
to be met as the restrictions on commercial 
speech "directly advance" the government's 
asserted substantial interest by attempting 
to reduce the demand for casino gambling. 
Finally, the Court found that the restric-
tions on commercial speech, as narrowly 
construed by the lower court, are no more 
extensive than necessary to serve the gov-
ernment's interest since they "will not af-
fect advertising of casino gambling aimed 
at tourists, but will apply only to such ad-
vertising when aimed at the residents of 
Puerto Rico." Id. at 4961. Thus, the Court 
concluded that the regulations, as con-
strued by the lower court, were facially 
constitutional under the Central Hudson 
test. 
The Court then addressed the appellant's 
second argument that the advertising re-
strictions were constitutionally defective 
under the holdings in Carey v. Population 
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), (strik-
ing down a ban on any "advertisement or 
display" of contraceptives); and Bigelow v. 
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), (reversing 
criminal conviction based on advertisement 
of an abortion clinic). However, the Court 
found those cases where "the underlying 
conduct that was the subject of the adver-
tising restrictions was constitutionally pro-
tected and could not have been prohibited 
by the State" distinguishable from casino 
gambling which the Puerto Rico Legisla-
ture could have prohibited altogether. 54 
U.S.L.W. at 4961. Thus, the Court ar-
rived at the conclusion that "the greater 
power to completely ban casino gambling 
necessarily includes the lesser power to 
ban advertising of casino gambling." Id. 
The Court restated this new first amend-
ment analysis more generally as "it is pre-
cisely because the government could have 
enacted a wholesale prohibition of the un-
derlying conduct that it is permissible for 
the government to take the less intrusive 
step of allowing the conduct, but reducing 
the demand through restriction of adver-
tising." Id. (emphasis in original). Con-
16-The Law Forurn/Fa/~ 1986 
tinuing on, the Court observed that "[l]eg-
islative regulation of products or activities 
deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alco-
holic beverages, and prostitution has varied 
from out right prohibition on the one hand 
... to legalization of the product or activity 
with restrictions on stimulation of its de-
mand on the other hand." Id. "To rule out 
the latter intermediate kind of response 
would require more than we find in the 
First Amendment," the Court concluded. 
Thus, the restrictions on advertising were 
upheld as constitutional. 
Justice Brennan dissented, stating that 
"I see no reason why commercial speech 
should be afforded less protection than 
other types of speech where, as here, the 
government seeks to suppress commercial 
speech in order to deprive consumers of 
accurate information concerning lawful 
activity." Id. at 4962. Justice Brennan also 
disagreed with the majority's deferral "to 
what it perceives to be the determination 
by Puerto Rico's legislature that a ban on 
casino advertising aimed at residents is 
reasonable." Id. at 4963. 
Justice Stevens also dissented, finding 
that "Puerto Rico blatantly discriminates 
in its punishment of speech depending on 
the publication, audience, and words em-
ployed." Id. at 4965. 
The first part of the Court's holding sim-
ply represents an extended application of 
the Central Hudson, first amendment anal-
ysis for commercial speech. However, it 
is the Court's introduction of "the greater 
power necessarily includes the lesser power" 
language into first amendment constitu-
tional analysis which gives this case special 
significance. Expansion of this new analy-
sis, even beyond that alluded to by the 
Court in its opinion, could eventually per-
mit further erosion of the various analysis 
under the freedom of speech. For example, 
a content-based restriction could possibly 
be disguised by the "greater includes the 
lesser" analysis. It remains to be seen 
whether this is the direction the new Court, 
possibly under Justice Rehnquist, will take. 
-Eric P. Macdonell 
Frye v. Frye: MARYLAND 
REAFFIRMS THE PARENT -CHILD 
IMMUNITY RULE 
In Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542 (1986), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to 
overturn the parent-child immunity rule 
which has existed in Maryland for fifty-six 
years. The court also declined to create an 
exception to the rule for cases involving 
the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 
In Frye, the plaintiffs, George L. Frye III, 
a minor, and his mother, Barbara Frye, re-
ceived injuries when the automobile in 
which they were passengers went off the 
road and collided with a culvert. At the 
time of the occurrence, the automobile 
was being operated by George L. Frye, Jr., 
who was the father and husband of the 
passengers. 
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court 
for Prince Georges County by Barbar~ 
Frye, individually and as guardian and 
next friend of George L. Frye, III, against 
George L. Frye, Jr. for damages incurred 
as a result of the defendant's negligence. 
The court granted a motion to dismiss the 
action as to Barbara Frye, individually, on 
the ground that the doctrine ofinterspousal 
immunity had been in effect upon the ac-
crual of her cause of action and thus, relief 
could not be granted. The court also dis-
missed the action brought on behalf of 
George L. Frye, III on the ground that no 
relief could be granted under the parent-
child immunity rule. 
Barbara Frye appealed to the court of 
special appeals. In the meantime, the court 
of appeals granted Mrs. Frye's request for 
the court to certify the records and pro-
ceedings before a decision was rendered by 
the court of special appeals. 
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that 
the parent-child immunity rule should be 
abrogated as to torts sounding in negli-
gence in light of the court's recent abroga-
tion of inters po usa 1 immunity. See Boblitz 
v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 
(1983). In the alternative, the plaintiff con-
tended that an exception should be carved 
from the parent-child immunity rule for 
motor vehicle torts. The court refused to 
create the exception. 
Parent-child immunity, a creation of the 
American judicial system, was adopted 
by the court of appeals in Schneider v. 
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
As construed in Maryland, the rule bars 
suits by a child against his or her parent 
and by a parent against his or her child for 
personal injury arising from a tort. The 
court of appeals has recognized two excep-
tions to the rule. First, the court has held 
that a minor child has a right to maintain a 
cause of action against his or her parent for 
"cruel and inhuman treatment or for ma-
licious and wanton wrongs." Mahnke v. 
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 
(1951). Secondly, the court has declined to 
extend the parent-child immunity rule to 
encompass a suit between an emancipated 
child and a parent. Waltzinger v. Birsner, 
212 Md. 107,.128 A.2d 617 (1957). 
Frye is the first case, since the adoption 
of parent-child immunity in Maryland, in 
